THE NON-FIGHTING FORCES OF THE UNITED NATIONS: AN INSTRUMENT FOR THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES DEDICATION ACKNOWLEDGMENTS When one coin on to the end of a graduate program and the completion of a dissertation, there are many persons to whom a debt of gratitude is owed. To all those who guided me in ray graduate courses and who assisted me with this t am particularly indobted to Dr. Frederick Hartmann. Hot only did Dr. Hartmann stimulate my interest in the field of international relations, but he also directed my attention to the subject of peace-keeping groups. His perceptive comments and constant encouragement have been invaluable to this study. I am deeply grateful for his generous assistance. My thanks go too to Dr. Arnold Heidenheimer for his gestions in connection with this study. I wish to express as well my gratitude to Dr. Manning Dauor for his assistance crises with dispatch and kindness. I would like to thank the University of Florida for the financial aid which made possible my graduate studies and the preparation of this dissertation. X am grateful to the staff of the library of tbo Univorsity of Florida for its OKMLBDGMKNTS I. IHTKODUCTIOH II. PBACE-RBISPINO THBOlWii I»IW«»AT10!I-A RuWIWJVB . ■ THU( il ■ ■ iAN ZAE10K IN 17 17 20 29 29 33 35 38 38 Honey: the financial bsae 52 notarial: the logistic bane 56 The legal statue of the Truoe Supervision Organ! to tion . . The Truoe Supervision Organisation in Action The role of the Truce Supervision Organisation Organisation for action . . The functioning of the observers III. PEACE-KEEPING THROUGH OBSBRVATION-AN ESTABLISHED INSTRUMENT: THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVATION GROUP IN LEBANON Introduction Conditions for Creation of UNOGIL. Lebanon. . . The United Nations involvement. ..... The precedents for peace-keeping The Establishment of the Observation Group . The establishment The legal foundations The mandate Characteristics of UNOGIL. Leadership of UNOGIL. Support for UNOGIL. . UNOGIIi Money: the financial base of UNOGIIi. . Material: the logistic base of UNOGIL. The legal status of UNOGIL UNOGIIi in Action The organisation of UNOGIIi. The functioning of UNOGIIi . 1A7 1«6 155 165 170 177 178 59* TABLES The Growth of UNOGIL : The 2. The Scope of Observational Activity by UNOGIL from June through Ootober, 1958 138 3. Source of Troops for OHUC 297 Record of Critical Votes in the Security Council on the Establishment and Support of Peace-Keeping Groups Selected Critical Votes in the General Assembly on the Establishment and Support of Peace-Eeeping Groups The Rational Composition of URTSO The Rational Composition of UHOGIL. 455 456 458 459 B-4. The Rational Composition of OEUC at Selected Times 461 B-5. The Rational Composition of the United Rations Force in Cyprus (URFIOIP) ....... 463 keeping Expenses and^ 464 LIST FIGURES 1. Organisation oliort or United Nations Truco Supervision Organisation 2. Organisation chart or United Notions responsibilities over time . . 4 , Organisation chart of United Rations 65 J26 551 INTRODUCTION The blue berets of the Unitea Nations military men who do not fight norve eo a symbol of the world' a concern for peace. In mid-196d the "blue berets" watched over the peace of the world in remote and scattered areas: in the hot deserts of Sinai and the Gasa Strip; in mountainous and barren 'femes; in the borderland of Kashmir; in the lovely, troubled isle of Cyprus. In the past they have served in Greece, Indonesia, Lebanon, the Congo, and West New Guinea. In this study it is proposed to examine the develop- ment and use by the United Nations of the military presence as an instrument of pacific settlement. The non-fighting force, 1 as wo will term the military presence, is an inter- national military contingent which is neither equipped for real hostilities nor intended really to fight. Called into being not for purposes of collective security, but for those of paciTic settlement, it is injected into a situation of tension, instability, and potential violence to prevent or o the military forces, in The United. Nations It represents in tangible form the concern community that righting be prevented. It n because of wbnt it represents. The non-fighting force is one of the most significant innovations in the realm of pacific settlement made by the United nations. It is both e reflection of the challenges which have confronted that body and a commentary on United which the United Nations hae had to cope has boon a complex and difficult one. Problems ore many and hardly made more simple by the setting within which they occur: one of a world ooraplloated by its division into conflicting power blocs} by the recent rise of a number of turbulent, dis- contented, nawly-independent states; and by the awesome ir of nuclear weapons. In this difficult a uneasy world outbreaks of violence have been frequent, particularly in the areas j u s t emerging from colonial stat The solutions to the problems causing the violence are not easy to find. In most oases the issues hove not been blac or white — noithor the identity of one "aggressor," who might bo dealt with handily by sanctions, nor just and aocoptable solutions have alwaya bean clearly evident. Yet for the United Nations to do nothing in a crisis merely for financing tie force were laid and its functions defined. The nations contributing the men were to supply their con- tingents with equipment, pay their regular salaries, and advance funds for their transportation and maintenance, ill in their home state would he repaid by the League, with re- imbursement of the League by Poland and Lithuania. This project was abandoned, however, before it could come to fruition when it became apparent that it could be executed only with great difficulty. There was too much opposition and too little real support for the League action. Poland and Lithuania accepted in theory the idea of the plebiscite guaranteed by an international force, but in practice co- operated but little. Opposition by the Soviet Union may have delivered the final blow to the plan, for the states contributing to the force were not anxious to send their troops in when a neighboring great power objected. The second effort to establish* an international force, again to maintain conditions for a fair plebiscite, was more successful. In 1934 the League Council created an inter- national force whioh operated with Frenoh and German consent to ensure order before, during, and after the Saar plebiscite. ^William Frye , A United Nations Peace Force (Hew York: Oceana for The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1957), p. 50. Colombian settlement of Letitia, the League Council resolved the issue by placing Letitia under the administration of a League Commission for one year. The Commission was assisted by an "international force." The international force was, in fact, composed only of Colombian soldiers deputised by the League of Nations and wearing speoial arm-bands. early In the history or the Un i tod Notions. Tho larger fall In tho middle. At the far end or tho ranee would bo the small armies established by the United Nations to keep the peace. Some characteristics common to all these groups in the United Nations was one in which righting had occurred and was liable to break out again; in which emotions over the issues were high and agreement not readily reached, flost involved nations which had gained their independence since the Second World War. The purpose or the observers was to quiet the situation not through forceful means — for they were few in number and unarmed — but through tho moral and psychological effect conveyed by their presence. The purpose and means of the peace-keeping force were similar to those of the observers though a limited use of arms was possible to them. The small observer groups might be considered as the prototype or the military presence. The small observer group technique has been uaed by the United Nations in three situations; in Greece from 194U to 1954 ; in Indonesia from 1947 to 1951; and in Kashmir from 19«9 to the present. In Groeee observation was carried out along a 500 mile border by between 30 end 40 military observers operating personnel , , as welt os the equipment necessary for the mission at the outset,^ come from eight, states — Australia, Brasil, China, Prance, Mexico, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States — all or which wore members of the Special Committee on the Balkans. in Indonesia approximately Sfl observers served, selected from the same countries that were members of the Consular Commission: Australia, Belgium, China, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In Kashmir, observers have been on duty since early 19" 9 to aid in maintaining the cease-fire between India and Pakistan. The observers have numbered about sixty over the years. The initial seconding states were Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, were under the direction, at least initially, of the special ..'•'■i'll Committee sum largo enough to cover Secre tary-G en oral response. m ’ — 1 budgets did includ ^Pakistan w on tho Balkans, bu. the Spocial Committee w ixt General Assembly so appropriation to cover a Special Committee esumably they might also have participated i oup's activity. This might b — ' • N. Doc. A/57" , p. 2. Observation Mission In Yemen. Those groups have been con- siderably larger enfl mere expensive than the prototype observer teams. They hove ranged in else from 200 bo 600 men and have been supplied with a substantial amount or communications and reconnaissance equipment. Their mission is correspondingly expanded. It may include investigation as well as observation. World opinion may be mobilised to supplement the observer presence as a deterrent to aggres- sion. Such groups move the United Nations a step closer to use of a full-fledged military force. Both the Palestine and Lebanon endeavors were ambitious enough to qualify as miniature armed forces. Their experience is directly rele- vant to the emergence of the technique of the peace-keeping This emergence L-fledged military force the United Nations Emergency crisis in 1956. It was followed by the United Nations Force in the Congo, created in I960 and ranging in size from 15,000 to 20,000 men, and the Force in Cyprus, set up in 1969 and numbering about 7,000. These forces represent the furthest extension of the United Nations development of peace-keeping techniques. Not only were they far larger in size and more expensive than the observer groups, but they also had somewhat brooder powers at their disposal. Although 12 in theory and in moot cases the powers of the peace-keeping .force are only slightly greater than those of the observer group, in practice considerably greater powers have been exercised at times, particularly by the Force in the Congo. This study will examine comparatively and in depth the non-fighting force technique as utilised in four cases: the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation in Palestine, the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon, the United Nations Emergency Force, and the United Nations Force in the Congo. Reference will be made as well to the recent uses of this technique in Yemen and Cyprus. There are striking differences in the characteristics of these four groups: differences first in the else of the contingents, which range from the 689 man maximum of the Palestine group to the 19,707 man maximum foroe used in the Congo; differences too in the situation which called the units into being. In Palestine the organisation was there primarily to maintain a truce imposed on Jews and Arabs by the United Nations. In Lebanon the organisation was stationed at Lebanese borders to observe and stop infiltra- tion from without by spotting it. In Sue* the force was to stabilise the international relationships of the states in- volved by making possible the withdrawal of British, French, and Israeli forces from Egypt and ensuring against a re- sumption of hostilities between Egypt and Israel. In the 13 Congo the Unload Nations Force was bo help establish internal order in the newly independent nation, thereby bringing about the withdrawal of Belgian forces brought in intervention of outside powers, and aiding the Congo to become a viable state. Both the Lebanese and Congo situations were complicated by overtones of civil war. Despite the admittedly significant differences be- tween the groups, they can be considered as a unit because of all they shore. All are composed of military man; all are used in situations of tension, instability, actual or potential fighting. All initially have a common purpose, to promote peaceful settlement by curbing violence through the effect of their organised and disciplined presence os repre- sentatives of the United Nations. Although they may be armed, they are backed by the prestige and power of the organisation rather than primarily by the power of weapons. At the same time, the discipline of the personnel makes them capable of quick and effective response on behalf of the organisation within a context where the use of force is or may become prevalent. •Phe study is divided into two main parts. In the first section oase studies of the four peace-keeping groups are presented. In each case an examination is undertaken of the origins, characteristics, and operation of the group. Political, leg'll, financial, awl administrative factors are taken into account. An effort has been made to make each of the cases parallel the others as cloeely as possible in order to facilitate generalisation. The second part of the study is devoted to an analysis of the technique of the non-fighting force, based on the material developed in the case studies. The objectives of this analysis of the non-fighting force technique as an instrument of peaceful settlement are two-fold. The first aim is to determine the nature of the instrument which has been developed. We are particularly concerned with the degree to which an institutionalised technique, readily available in recognizable form for use in crises, has emerged and the degree to which each force is unique. Going beyond the question of extent of institu- tionalization is that of the reasons and significance of the institutionalization which has occurred. The analysis peaceful settlement leads m second central purpose of t performance and potential o fighting force a hypothesized on 0 or less directly to the 1 study: the evaluation of t the non-fighting force. Th ie effectiveness of the non- te experience thus far wit! evaluation, first, of the 3-fitting fore unenthusiastically receivod and so emasculated as to be transformed into a resolution to establish a small field service. Not much was said about non-fighting forces in the early 1950 's, perhaps because fighting forces were still too much in the forefront. Prom 1956 forward, however, under the impetus of the successes of the United Nations Emergency steadily, seriously, and at times with impressive origins. In general, those proposals have originated less often with members of the United Nations Secretariat than with indi- vidual statesmen. United Nations delegations, Governments, and non-governmental organizations . One of the most per- sistent advocates of some sort of permanent force has been Lester Pearson of Canada; among the most influential advocates were Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy. In the face of these efforts to make more and more extensive use of the non-fighting force as an arm of the United Nations, it seems that it is time to evaluate on the basis of past experience the merits and usefulness of the non-fighting force. CHAPTER PEACE-K EKPING THROUGH OBSERVATION-A FORMATIVE STAGE: THE TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION IN PALESTINE Introduction In Palestine in May, 19'i8, violent fighting erupted between Israeli and Arab. A truce supervision organization, created by the United Nations to help still that violence, stands as one of the pioneering ventures in the field of peacekeeping through the, use of the military man in a non-fighting capacity. la the first decade of the United Nations there were other uses of military observers — in Greece, in Indonesia, in Kashmir, for example. Yet the Truce Supervision Organi- zation in Palestine differs from these truce observation teams. The difference lies primarily in the extensiveness and scope of the operation, but this difference is so great In Palestine the Truce Supervision Organization reached a total size of over 600 men and had at its dispo- sal twelve airplanes, 150 jeeps and trucks, and four ships with their crews. It had extensive communications equipment 17 and its own communications Bystetn, lb was, In short, almost a little army — albeit a little army without guns.^ Many of the rudiments of the military force are found in the Palestine group. In the problems faced and solved, in the accumulation of precedents and personnel experienced in the use of the military, there are links, direct as well as indirect, between the Palestine experience and the later use of the non-fighting force in more ambitious endeavors. The Palestine venture moves the United Nations a step for- ward in the employment of the non-fighting force bo carry through its objectives. To fully understand the place of the United Hatlons Truce Supervision Organisation in the development of the non-fighting force os a technique of pacific settlement, il- ls necessary to briefly review the history of the Organisa- tion: its origins, characteristics, and functioning. Conditions for Creation of the Truce Organisation The United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation of the Truce Organist Ralph Bunc'he , Acting Mediator, international C said that the operation b. * diplomatic and a h United Nations Headquarters. General Assembly, ing (November , p. 609. See (UNTSO) was designed to aymbolisio United Nations concern that righting l fashion the halted in Palestine, o the problems at issue. In other problem areas fighting had occurred w out evoking such a strong United Nations response. Wh were the conditions which led to the use in this case a contingent of military men to represent the United N presence? Organization into existence. First, the United Nations had special responsibilities with respect to the Palestine problem stemming from its prior involvement in the situation coupled with its failure either to find a solutioa ac- ceptable to ail parties or to win agreement of the United Nations members to the imposition of a solution. Second, the fact of open and heavy fighting between Jew and Arab in the Holy Land made apparent the urgent need for 6ome sort of action. Finally, the variety of solutions and the proposals for a United Nations enforced peace put forth in early 1948 as well as the tentative experimentation with a establishment of a peace-keeping group to quell the vio- lence and to facilitate the search for a permanent solution. 20 United nations involvement with Palestine dates from the spring of 1947 when the United Kingdom, despairing of Arab hostility to the plan and the announced unwillingness of Britain, the mandatory power, to cooperate in implementing a plan unaooeptable to either of the principals. a 2he plan was based on the majority recommendations of the eleven member United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, set up in the spring of 1947 by a Special Session of the General Assembly to make recommendations on Palestine. She majority plan was recommended by Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, and Uruguay. A three- nation minority of India, Iran, and Yugoslavia recommended a abstained. For the report of the Committee see u!n. Doc. A/364. ably and The precedents -keeping The United Hattons could hardly ignore a situation becoming ever more violent with which it was directly in- volved. Proposals, plans, and limited measures of United Nations peace-keeping tumbled one after another between November, 19'*7, and Nay, 1978 . Although these proposals set few concrete precedents for the Truce Supervision Organization, they probably contributed to creation of an atmosphere conducive to decisive action ultimately by the United Nations. The General Assembly had made virtually no initial provision for implementation of the partition decision beyond setting up a five-nation Palestine Commission to administer the territory in the interim period between the Nandatory Power's departure and the establishment of the Arab and Israeli states. The Security Council was in- structed to give all necessary aid and guidance to the Commission and to take the neoessary measures for implemen- tation of the plan. It was Boon apparent that the Commis- sion would need help to fulfill its mission. Two major efforts in the spring of 1978 to provide such assistance can be delineated: the call for a force for Palestine and the establishment of a truce commission. In January and February, 1978, both Secretary-General Trygve Lie and the Palestine Commission struggled with the 23 double problem of executing the partition decision and of smothering the violence already aflame in the Holy Lend. Both put forward, more or less openly, proposals for forceful action by the United Hations. The proposals were received with little enthusiasm and less action. The Secretary-Goncral , who "put the full weight of (his) office consistently behind the organisation's de- cision from the time it was first taken," took two approaches.-* On the one hand, he quietly set in motion Secretariat studies of the possibilities of creating an international police force and inaugurated exploratory conversations with some of the smaller nations on their willingness to supply a force to execute the Palestine decisions. On the other hand, in public statements he tried to impress the Security Council members with their responsibility for enforcing the resolution. The Palestine Commission was more direct in its proposals. The Commission found it impossible to assume its responsibilities due to violence in Palestine and a lack of cooperation by Britain, the mandatory power. It therefore confronted the Security Council with a special report in which it contended that an armed force was neces- sary to bring an end to fighting in Palestine and to enable Kacmillan^Company,*!'^'*;, p. ltd. liniaii 35 Security Council authority to use force to cope with threats to and breschos of the peace did not extend to the use of such force to implement a recommendation by the General Assembly. In the race of doubts on the legal soundness of the forceful action and the unwillingness of the major powers to alienate either side, the practical problem of where to get troops for a force loomed large. Yet, the report of the Palestine Commission was not without significance. It triggered reconsideration of the entire Palestine issue, first in the Security Council from February through April, 19'i8; then in the Second Special Session of the General Assembly, meeting from April 16 to May 14, 1948. The search for on alternative political solution to partition was not fruitful.^ Reconsideration did lead, however, to a separation of the problems of fighting and of the future of Palestine. As it became in- creasingly apparent that a political solution would not be found quickly or easily and as the fighting intensified, efforts were concentrated on halting the Arab-Israeli conflict. 'The United States delegation raised t of a temporary trusteeship for Palestine and willingness to supply some soldiers for the p lishing such a trusteeship. The idea was not majority of the United Rations members h i possibility 26 The Security Council attempted to quiet t situation through a series of cease-fire calls, April 1 through the end of May, and by creation Commission. The cease-fire resolutions called i the Palestine Ln varying May 29 resolution ell were virtually ignored. Yet the Security Council activity in the period prior bo the effective truce had an influence on the truce which was finally established and on the organisation set up to maintain it. Establishment of the Truce Commission can be singled out as of particular importance to later developments. The Commission was created by a resolution of April 23 to assist the Security Council in implementing the cease-fire calls and to report to the Council on the situation in Palestine. The experience of the Truce Commission revealed the need for an expanded truce supervisory organisation, thereby stimu- lating the creation of such an organisation. It also pro- vided a formula for determining the national composition of the organisation, once established. (By suggestion of the United States, the Commission was composed of repre- sentatives of the members of the Seourity Council that had consular representatives in Jerusalem with the exception of Syria, Under this formula the Commission was composed of representatives of the United States, Belgium, and France. ^ u The justification for this method of selection was attention to the problem of truce supervision with requests for more assistance. First, in connection with a proposal to demilitarise Jerusalem, the Commission queried the Security Council in early May on the possibility of obtain- ing a fifty-man force to provide the guarantees necessary to both sides if the truce were to be upheld. Seoond, in a cable of May 21 the Commission indicated its need Tor a small body of competent military observers to assist it in carrying through its functions. In the same cable the Commission expressed the conviction that the only effective means to bring a cessation of hostilities was through employment of a neutral force, sufficiently large and powerful to impose its will on one or both parties, created under Article '11 or Article 42 of the Charter. 11 The that use of representatives already in Palestine would be a prompt, effective, and simple way of providing the Se- curity Council with on arm in Palestine to report to it and to help execute its decisions. Significantly, in tho light of later developments, objections to this method of selec- tion were voiced by the delegates of the Soviet Union and of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, both of whom ab- stained on the resolution establishing the Commission. Security Council, Official Records, 3rd Year, 287th meeting ox io ~ m & Icing ii; Some delegates ing^ officers into Pale source of oontrol offi. was too dangerous. Ih since no functions of , assigned t decide that the Commission, created f should now undertake control, and nolice ", Official *-■ *— - initially •d not Ssff V'Si’iS !:;°S ’xr a5 ‘" u: vhe ending of the British mandate, and the invasion of Arab tive from July 18, 1948. Although the truce was replaced in August, 1949, by an armistice based on agreements between Israel and Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria respectively, a the parties to maintain the armistice and to ensure obser- The lirst Truce a eral Assembly resolut Kay 15 resolution of Play 29. foundation provided Trues Supervision Organisation by the Assembly and the Council was skeletal. Neither the resolutions themselves nor the debate accompanying them laid down precise guide- lines as to what the Organization was to be. The unwilling- ness of the United Nations members to draw definitive lines for the truce group suggests a resistance to heavy involve- ment and limits to support for the truce. The General Assembly resolution called for a truce and established a mediator, to be selected by a committee of the General Assembly — the committee designated was com- The Mediator's principal functions wore to arrange a truce in Palestine and to promote a peaceful settlement between Arabs and Jews. The provision which provided the basis for a truce organization merely stated "that the Secretary- General shall provide the Mediator with an adequate staff." 1 ** The Security Council resolution was also vague on details of the Truce Organization. Its provisions instruc- ted the Mediator, in cooperation with the Truce Commission, of military observers should bo provided. That was all. ‘Vne May 15, 19A8, General Assembly resolution was resolution 186 (S-II). The Security Council resolution was passed at the 510th meeting of the Council and can be found ^General Assembly resolution 186 (S-II). Debate Supervision Organi- sation was almost non-existent. The General Assembly resolution which established the position of Mediator had received little discussion before passage. The resolution was proposed by the United States in a sub-commission set up originally to consider a provisional regime for Palestine, but diverted in the face of fighting (and inability to agree on any provisional regime) to the problem of v Holy band. The Mediator proposal was put fort the next to last day of the Special Session, w statement that despite its late introduction, represented, not something new, but merely the views which had been expressed in the sub-committee. The discussion of the resolution in the plenary session centered on whether the position of Mediator should be established at all, not on the proper scope of responsibilities of the n May 15, e provision Mediator. Debate in the Security Council did little more to clarify the role and nature of the proposed Truce Organisa- tion. At the time of passage of the May 29 resolution attention was focused not on the role c Truce Organisation but on the question The extent of unwillingness of of whether mediation ic Security Council commit itself Organisation is suggested by 52 the failure of any Security Council members bo come forth with substantive suggestions at a session of the Council convened for the express purpose of formulating instructions for the Mediator in establishing the Truce Organisation. The French delegate apparently expressed the view of the Council when he suggested that confidence along with wide powers to implement the resolution should be given the Mediator. 1 -* The votes in the General Assembly and Security Council on the truce resolutions suggest substantial support for the truce and its organisation. The vote on the May 14 General Assembly resolution establishing the truce was 51 in favor, 7 against, and 16 abstentions. 1 *’ The opposition came from the Communist bloo nations and Cuba. The expressed reason for Soviet disfavor was that the truce operation represented a Western maneuver to prevent partition from becoming effective. 1 ^ That Soviet opposition was designed ‘■'•’Security Council, Official Records . 3rd Tear, 313th meeting (June 3, 1940), p. so. 16 The states which abstained wore the Arab members of the United nations, joined by some Latin American states and Australia, Siam, and Greece. General Assembly, Official Records , Pud Special Session, 135th plenary mooting (May 14, 194577pp. ^44 -4 3. Soo Appendix A for a complete listing ^Xn fact, the opposition bo the Truce Supervision Organisation fits the pattern of Soviet thinking about the United Nations during this period, with its general hos- tility to any sort of United Nations police system on the basis it infringed national sovereignty and its insistence 33 merely to voice disapproval and not to kill all action is suggested by the fact that the Soviet Union and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic abstained on the criti- cal votes in the Security Council. T he legal foundations The legal foundation for the establishment and functioning of the Truce Supervision Organisation rested on the General Assembly resolution of May It, 1948, and the Security Counoil resolutions of May 29 and July 15, 1948. The authority under which the position of the Mediator was created and an organization to aid him authorized was not specified in the resolution. However, there was no chal- lenge raised as to the power of the General Assembly to create a subsidiary organ under Article 22 of the Charter to assist it in performing its functions. More question could be raised os to the provisions of the Charter under which the Security Council called for on end to hostilities. The Security Council calls for a cease- fire prior to the May 29 call had been clearly taken under Chapter VI of the Charter. Apparently the May 29 and July 15 cease-fire resolutions were also taken under Chapter VI, on the veto and on keeping Important decisions in the Se- curity Council whore they were subject to the veto. For further discussion of the Soviet position see Alexander Dali in ^ The Soviet Unlonat the United Nations (New York! 34 but each made reference to Chapter VII and seemed to move progressively closer to actual invocation of enforcement In the debate in the Security Council on the May 29 resolution two schools of thought emerged. One, including tbe Soviet Union and the United States among its proponents, called for action under the enforcement provisions of Chapter VII, apparently feeling that stronger action than had been taken in the post was necessaxv.^ The other school of opinion, including among its adherents Belgium and Britain, called for action under Chapter VI, viewing invocation of Chapter VII os a serious and uncertain step. There was feeling that invocation of Chapter VII without assurance of effective application of measures of coercion and without knowledge of all the potential consequences of such action was a serious step, not to be lightly taken. ^ The May 29 resolution did refer to Chapter VII, how- ever, and the July 19 resolution made even greater use of that section of the Charter. In the July 19 resolution the parties were for the first time ordered to comply with the measures specified by the Council under Article 40 of the For the Soviet statement see Security Council, Official Records . 3rd Year, 509th meeting (May 29, 1948), p. 23 For the United States statement see Security Council, Official Records . 3rd Year, 308th meeting (May 28, 1948), pp. 13=22: ^Security Council. Official Records. 3rd Year. 309th meeting (May 29, 1948), pp. 10-14. Charter. Article AO refers to provisional measures under Article 42, Nonetheless, the reference to action under Chapter VII was potentially significant. In theory at least such a resolution opened the way to forceful action hy the United Nations in the event of failure by the parties to comply with the cease-fire order or of truce violations. In fact, however, strong action was not taken by the United Nations when truce violations of a serious nature did occur. Although some question remains as to the precise provisions of the Charter under which the United Nations was acting, it would appear that the potential authority embodied in the July 15 resolution was greater than the authority actually invoked under that resolution. It may be suggested that political rather than legal factors explain the limited response of the United Nations to some serious breeches of The mandate The truce supervisors' mandate was based on the May 29 and July 15 resolutions calling for a truce and on the terms of the truce itself. The resolutions and the debate accompanying them provided only the most general guidelines under which they were to operate. The resolutions called 36 for an end fco hostilities, banned the introduction of mili- tary men or materials into the belligerent area, and enjoined the protection of Holy Places and shrinos. None of the resolutions specified precisely what the role of the observers was to be in ensuring that the truce terms would be carried through. It was left largely to the Mediator to spell out the role of the truce observers — the responsi- bilities they should bear and the policies they should follow in meeting these responsibilities. The mandate of the observers, as defined by the Mediator on the basis of the relevant resolutions, limited the role the observers could play in the Palestine crisis. It is true, however, that the Mediator initially interpre- ted the responsibilities of the observers in relatively broad fashion. Their primary purpose, in his view, was to prevent a renewal of large-scale fighting during the truce and to preserve the equitability of the truce. The phrase "to prevent" might have opened the door to a widening of the authority of the observers. The door which was opened was quickly slammed shut. Potential disagreement among the members on the preventive functions of the observers was forestalled by the Secretary-General ' s firm declaration that the Truce Supervision Organisation had no preventive authority and could not taka any preventive measures in advance. 2 ® Moreover, the conditions under which the observers were to function were narrowly drawn. First, the observer was to be "completely objective in his attitude and judg- ment" and to "maintain a thorough neutrality as regards political issues in the Palestine situation." 21 Such a requirement was probably necessary for success in a delicate mission. Second, the power available to the observer to meet his responsibilities was quite limited. He had, for example, no enforcement power and was denied arms of any sort. The decision on arms was made by the Mediator. That it corresponded with the desires of a majority of member states was indicated by the rejection by the members of later efforts of the Mediator to broaden the powers of a few of the observers by arming them for especially difficult tasks. Although the invocation of Chapter VX2 of the Charter in the July 15 cease-fire call might have justified such a broaden- ing of the observers' mandate, no effort was made to use the resolution for this purpose. •M. Bloomfield, Egypt. Israel (Toronto: The Carswell Company, Ltd., 21 U.H. Doc. S/928, p. 1. 19577 ; Characteristics Organisation Tile creation of a non-fighting military unit to help restore and maintain peace represents only the first stage of United Nations action in a crisis. The group must not only he created! it must also operate effectively in the field to achieve its objectives. It may be suggested that the ability of the group to carry through its charge will depend on the balance of the equation of its responsibili- ties and its powers. Intimately related to the power of the force are the characteristics of the force itself. Three aspects of the force seem particularly relevant to the determination of its effectiveness: a) its leadership: b) its size and character; and c) its support at head- quarters and in the field. Support in turn takes several forms. At United Nations headquarters it oan be read in terms of votes, finances, logistics, and manpower. In the field cooperation and non-cooperation are indicative of the attitude of those with whom the force deals. Leadership The Security Council resolution calling for establish- ment of a mediator to supervise the truce provided that he should be appointed by the permanent members of the Security Council. On the advice of Secretary-General Trygve Lie the permanent members selected Count Polke Bernadotte of Sweden Mediator. Bernadotbe served as Mediator until assassination by Jewish terrorists in September, 1948. At that time the Secretary-General appointed Bernodotte's principal assistant. Dr. Ralph Bundle, as Acting Mediator.®* The Mediator was vested with both great powers and great responsibilities in the creation of a truce super- vision organization. With few precedents to follow and little guidance from the Security Council or the Assembly, the Mediator made the crucial decisions which gave shape and form to the Truce Organization and, incidentally, set a pattern for the future. According to the United States representative on the Security Council, the Truce Organiza- tion was not the product of the Council or the Assembly but of the Mediator who had built it from the staff of the Truce Commission and the staff assembled by the Secretary-General.^ However, it would be misleading to suggest that the Mediator was unfettered in his determinations regarding the shape and character of the Truce Organization. In fact, the Truce Supervision Organization seems to have evolved from a mix of the Mediator's decisions, the situation itself, and *^It slight be noted that although the resolution calls for selection of the Mediator by the permanent members of the Security Council, Buncbe served as Acting Mediator for nearly a year on the basis of the appointment by the Secre- tary-General. The appointment was ratified by the Security Council . ^Security Council, Official Records . 4th Year, 437th meeting (August 11, 19*9) , P- 7. the influence of the Secretariat and of certain of the national delegations, particularly the United States. The relationship between the Mediator and the Secretary-General appears to have been one of close collabo- ration. Although the critical decisions seem to have been made by the Mediator, there is evidence that the Secretary- General's role in the decision-making process went beyond merely implementing the requests of the Mediator. 2<l Several things suggest an important part for the Secretary-General in the Palestine operation: first, the Secretary-General's role in selecting the Mediator, for it was Lie who proposed Bernadotte as Mediator and who appointed Bunche Acting Mediator; second, the close personal friendship between the Secretary-General and both Bernadotte and Bunche; and third, the foot of direct and evidently much-used communications between Lake Success and the Mediator's headquarters Rhodes. What was the relationship of the Mediator to the Security Council and particularly to those nations which were most concerned with the Palestine question because of According to Stephen Schwebol effort in Palestine might be classifi' headquarters endeavor ' e United Nations i>j-s Political Powers a— University Press, 19pd), Mediator and the Secretary- .n indispensably interdependent fashion. 1 f thg Uni ted Nations: membership ou the Truce Commission and consequently partici- pation in the Truce Supervision Organisation? These on the decisions and actions or the Mediator, but they did hold an ultimate check, ir his decisions wore not regarded favorably, pressures could be exerted to alter them or to prevent their implementation. Thus, the Mediator’s de- cisions on both the composition and the site of the truce group were modified under the pressure of the national delegations, acting not openly through Security Council re- jection of proposals, but through inaction and behind-the- scenes pressures. It is not without significance that both Trygve Lie and Count Bernadotte were activists, desiring strong United Hations action to resolve the Palestine issue. While they gave vigorous leadership to the Truce Organisation, their more ambitious objectives were curbed by the caution of the Security Council. The scope and limits of the Mediator's powers will beoome clearer with on examination of the de- cisions made on suoh crucial aspects of the truce group as Support f o organisation . -One a significant decisions made with respect t Initial Organization regarded its composition. Bernadotte s thought was that the Truce Organization should he compos Council. Accordingly, on Kay JO, the Hediator contacted the French, British, American, and Soviet military attac tribute to a truce control organization. Within days th e Truce Commission, that is, the United Bernadotte suggested another reason for changing the b ai) Acoo-rd<ng to Bernadotte on June 2 the American charge d'affaires, calling to inform him unofficially^that the United aa a observerB i and n the°necessary staff and aircraft, also sug- lolk^Bernadotte , To Jerusalem (London: Hodder and Stoughton,. 195D, P. *5. *3 Whatever the reasons for the change in formula for participation, the change did bring the Truce Supervision Organization in line with a kind of rough rule-of-thumb the most convenient national representatives (i.e. those with some prior involvement with the question or area). cinate in the Truce Organization had two limitations. First, ^Security Council, Official Records , 3rd fear, meeting (July 13, 19*8), pT*T. 333rd afers.